As illuminated forcefully by Professor Newton's provocative analytical and historical excursion, as long as tests are employed to practical ends (prediction, selection, etc.) there is little cause for the metatheoretic angst that occasions rounds of papers on the topic of validity. But then, also, there seems little need, within this context of test employment, for the concept validity itself, its presence in discourse merely serving to obscure what are typically well-defined technical issues. Perplexity and angst over the issue of validity arises from its role as a back door to measurement, the psychologist's wanting to have his or her cake and eat it too; cleave to the belief that his or her tests measure, while demurring in the use of the full-blooded measurement language that has, in the past, lead to his or her censure. The author reviews the concepts of validity and measurement. Though the author admires Professor Newton's efforts to bring clarity to thinking on the topic of test validity, as long as test validity is informed by a metaphysics, he argues that clarity will remain an unattainable goal, and incoherence a constant companion. (Contains 4 footnotes.)