This article combines a statistical analysis with qualitative research to investigate the dynamics of collective violence in one of its most recurrent forms--the food riot. Using an original dataset collected by the authors on 289 food riot episodes occurring in Argentina in December 2001, the article argues for the need to dissect the local, contextualized inner-dynamics of the episodes. We find significant interrelationships between three important factors: the presence or absence of police, the presence or absence of political party brokers, and the type of market looted (big/chain or small/local). We then conduct a qualitative and ethnographic analysis to illustrate how these interactions might play out in two ideal type looting scenes--one illustrating the role of public authorities at big, chain supermarkets, the other showing the importance of party brokers at small, local food markets. We conclude by calling for more such research to better understand the mechanisms and processes, especially the relationship between state power and party politics, involved with all forms of collective violence. (Contains 3 tables and 13 notes.)