The first of two papers presented in this section, "Price-Caps: Theory and Implementation" (Peter B. Linhart and Roy Radner) describes a proposed method of regulation involving price caps on core services and no price regulation of other services. This method is designed to replace rate-of-return regulation during a transition period to a deregulated long-distance telecommunications industry. In particular, the following implementation issues are addressed: (1) which services should be capped; (2) the starting point for the cap; and (3) changes in the economic environment that should be reflected in the cap, and how they should be reflected. The paper is supplemented by a table, and contains 12 footnote citations. The second paper, "Alternatives to Rate of Return Regulation" (Ingo Vogelsang) (abstract only) introduces a regulatory two-part monopoly pricing mechanism which permits a firm to freely choose the variable price of the two-part tariff as long as the fixed part obeys a constraint. It is noted that the firm using this mechanism will in every period receive an approximation to the welfare change caused by its price changes over the last period, and, contrary to most other suggestions for incentive pricing, this approach requires no government subsidies. (Author/EW)