In "Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from India"--a paper presented at the National Center on Performance Incentives research to policy conference in February--Karthik Muralidharan (Harvard University) and Venkatesh Sundararaman (The World Bank) present findings from a randomized experiment conducted in India to study the impact of performance incentives for teachers. The experiment included a representative sample of 500 government-run rural primary schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, and tested the effects of four treatments: (1) the addition of a para-teacher; (2) block grants for purchasing materials used directly by students; (3) incentive bonuses for teachers based on individual teacher performance; and (4) incentive bonuses for teachers based on school-wide performance. The first year of this experiment reveals that performance incentives are a cost-effective way to improve student test scores in math and language, and that additional schooling inputs such as the addition of a para-teacher or a school grant can also raise test scores--though not as much as incentive bonuses. [This research brief describes work published by the National Center on Performance Incentives in "Teacher Incentives in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence from India," by Karthik Muralidharan and Venkatesh Sundararaman, Working Paper 2008-13.]