Four experiments were conducted to explore issues in the development and modification of both moral choices and judgments of achievement using concepts and data from a social judgment perspective. In the first experiment, college students functioning at different reasoning levels indicated on a 20-point scale their strength of belief that an individual should or should not engage in a target act in several different dilemmas. For the second experiment, high school freshmen who had just completed a mandatory course in moral decision making were asked to evaluate eight moral dilemmas. For the third experiment, high school freshmen received training in reasoning which used different judgmental tasks to illustrate first simple and then complex integration strategies. For the fourth experiment, high school freshmen and college students were assigned to training, self-cuing, and control groups and asked to predict a person's achievement in either academic or sports performance based on information on that person's ability and effort. The experiments revealed that: (1) college students' higher scores on Defining Issues Tests did not reflect a greater tendency to rely on postconventional rationales or to be more complex; (2) high school freshmen trained in moral reasoning were absolutistic, while untrained students were relativistic; (3) cognitive processes are not unique to moral reasoning, but are general to any sort of social judgment, and probably to nonsocial judgments; and (4) college students are able to transfer skills from a trained rule to the logical extension of a reverse rule because they perceive ability as a fixed trait, while high school freshmen are less likely to transfer skills, in part because they assume ability varies with effort. (SD)