The article analyzes contrasting theories about the role of emotion in learning proposed by Alfred North Whitehead and Jerome Bruner. I argue that Whitehead's account of experience and emotion in his educational philosophy is best understood in the context of the philosophy of organism. Here he takes issue with the empiricists' view that sensa are the core of perception, and conceives of emotion as the primary bodily experience reaching out to the world as "prehensions" that provide continuity to experience. Bruner gives priority to cognition and the mental models that make problem solving possible. While he does acknowledge emotions as part of the fabric of the mind, they are shaped by what we know, which fully determines both experience and emotion. And when he embraces narrative thinking, it also excludes emotion in favour of "metacognitive sensitivity." A possible reconciliation is attempted by considering the relationship between consciousness and emotion, but this serves to underline the differences. Whitehead's realism and Bruner's constructivism also highlight the philosophical divide between the two thinkers. I conclude that Whitehead's theory of emotion in learning is richer and more inclusive than Bruner's.