During the past 150 years U.S. courts have demonstrated a special protectiveness toward academics and academic institutions. Academic freedom was not a concern when the U.S. Constitution and the First Amendment were drafted and is not mentioned in the "Federalist Papers." However, decisions by a series of Supreme Court justices led to…

Illuminates constitutional and economic problems involved in the process of insuring a free press and demonstrates that the government--armed with antitrust laws through its chief enforcer, the Justice Department--can, but does not, provide adequate safeguards. (Author/GT)

In a 1974 Yale Law School address, United States Supreme Court Justice Stewart stated that the institutional press, as far as the Constitution is concerned, is autonomous and may publish what it knows and may seek to learn what it can. He also noted that the Court had rejected the Constitutional claim of a journalist's privilege not to reveal a…

In the United States Supreme Court's only decision on the question of journalists' protecting their confidential sources (the "Branzburg trilogy" of cases decided in 1972), Justice Lewis Powell emphasized the importance of "striking a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant…

An analysis of the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions under Chief Justice Warren Burger does not indicate any pattern of repudiation of doctrinal advances made by earlier courts. Like its predecessors, the Burger Court has dealt most frequently with First Amendment cases requiring definition and interpretation of government abridgement. In…

The "least restrictive means" test, a frequently used tool for resolving First Amendment cases in federal courts, is designed to insure that state-imposed abridgement of free expression is limited to the narrowest scope and the least impact necessary to fulfill a compelling state interest. Analysis of the history of the test since its…

The United States Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) extended the scope of protection provided to the press when covering public officials, requiring officials claiming libel by the press to prove "actual malice" (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity). The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 limited…