A substantial body of literature considers excessive corruption an indicator of a weak state. However, in nondemocratic societies, corruption--whether informally approved, imposed, or regulated by public authorities--is often an indicator of a vertical power rather than an indicator of a weak state. This article explores the interrelations between the state and higher education institutions based on corruption as a mechanism of administrative control. It presents definitions of corruption, describes the concept of corruption and coercion as mechanisms of administrative control, offers a model, and develops model extension that accounts for peer pressure in academia. Higher education as an industry and universities as institutions or entities have certain features uncommon to other industries and institutions. Hence, theoretical frameworks should be adjusted to capture the specific features of higher education. University autonomy, financial independence, and accountability are used to investigate corrupt higher education institutions in nondemocratic regimes. In this article, the relations between the state and universities in nondemocratic regimes are analyzed using the case of higher education systems in the countries of the former Soviet Union, with a special focus on the Russian Federation and Ukraine, a region that has experienced dynamic change in both higher education systems and political structures during postsocialist transition. (Contains 1 table and 2 notes.)