ERIC Number: ED530752
Record Type: Non-Journal
Publication Date: 2012-Mar
Pages: N/A
Abstractor: As Provided
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: N/A
EISSN: N/A
School Governance, Teacher Incentives, and Pupil-Teacher Ratios: Experimental Evidence from Kenyan Primary Schools. NBER Working Paper No. 17939
Duflo, Esther; Dupas, Pascaline; Kremer, Michael
National Bureau of Economic Research
We examine a program that enabled Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) in Kenya to hire novice teachers on short-term contracts, reducing class sizes in grade one from 82 to 44 on average. PTA teachers earned approximately one-quarter as much as teachers operating under central government civil-service institutions but were absent one day per week less and their students learned more. In the weak institutional environment we study, civil-service teachers responded to the program along two margins: first, they reduced their effort in response to the drop in the pupil-teacher ratio, and second, they influenced PTA committees to hire their relatives. Both effects reduced the educational impact of the program. A governance program that empowered parents within PTAs mitigated both effects. Better performing contract teachers are more likely to transition into civil-service positions and we estimate large potential dynamic benefits of contract teacher programs on the teacher workforce.
Descriptors: Teacher Student Ratio, Incentives, Governance, Teacher Associations, Foreign Countries, Institutional Environment, Beginning Teachers, Elementary Education, Contract Training, Class Size, Parents, Teachers, Parent Associations, Parent Teacher Cooperation, Partnerships in Education, Government Employees
National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org
Publication Type: Reports - Research
Education Level: Elementary Education
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: National Bureau of Economic Research
Identifiers - Location: Kenya
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A