Comments on the article by Driver-Linn (see record 2003-05602-002), which presented an account of why psychologists have almost continuously invoked Kuhn since the 1970s to justify a wide array of the discipline's historical developments and epistemological proclivities. The current author suggests that perhaps the more pressing questions, however, are whether psychologists should feel comforted by Kuhn's theory--whether it is in any significant way applicable to the situation in psychology or just a convenient cover story--and whether it is true of any scientific discipline at all. He suggests that psychologists were drawn to Kuhn primarily as a promising way to break through the alliance between behaviorism and logical positivism that seemed to grip much of the discipline through the 1960s. If the most recent scholarship on Kuhn's account of science is correct, psychologists may have unwittingly exchanged the reality of epistemological radicalism for the mere illusion of it.