This paper examines whether the social science-based typology of Yvonne Lincoln and Egon Guba (1994), in which social science scholars are divided into positivist, postpositivist, critical, and constructivist paradigms based on ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions in the discipline, can be adapted to the academic discipline of law, and whether it can serve as the basis for making cross-disciplinary comparisons toward a better understanding of issues like faculty culture and knowledge production. Lincoln and Guba's typology of paradigms was adapted to law, and the constructs that organized the typology and the resulting classifications were tested in interviews with 22 legal scholars at 3 law schools. The social science-based typology of paradigms was found to apply to law. Even though law has a distinct disciplinary culture and legal scholars view the uses of knowledge differently, legal scholars expressed assumptions that conformed with the social science classifications, although positivism was combined with postpositivism as legal realism. The ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions of legal realists, and critical and interpretive legal scholars are discussed. (Contains 106 references.) (JPB)