Peer reviewed
ERIC Number: EJ696490
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2004-Aug-1
Pages: 7
Abstractor: Author
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: ISSN-0022-3808
EISSN: N/A
Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes.
Gilboa, Itzhak; Samet, Dov; Schmeidler, David
Journal of Political Economy, v112 n4 p932 Aug 2004
Harsanyi's utilitarianism is extended here to Savage's framework. We formulate a Pareto condition that implies that both society's utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals. An indiscriminate Pareto condition has been shown to contradict linear aggregation of beliefs and tastes. We argue that such a condition is not compelling: Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Our Pareto condition is restricted to choices that involve identical beliefs only.
Descriptors: Probability, Economic Research
University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005, Chicago, IL 60637. Tel: 773-753-3347; Web site: http://www.journal.uchicago.edu; e-mail: subscriptions@press.uchicago.edu
Publication Type: Journal Articles
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: N/A
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A