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Peer reviewed Peer reviewed
ERIC Number: EJ696093
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2004-Feb
Pages: 25
Abstractor: Author
ISSN: ISSN-0022-3808
Delegating Decisions to Experts
Li, Hao; Suen, Wing
Journal of Political Economy, v112 n1 p311 Feb 2004
We present a model of delegation with self-interested and privately informed experts. A team of experts with extreme but opposite biases is acceptable to a wide range of decision makers with diverse preferences, but the value of expertise from such a team is low. A decision maker wants to appoint experts who are less partisan than he is in order to facilitate information pooling by the expert team. Selective delegation, either by controlling the decision-making process or by conditioning the delegation decision on his own information, is an effective way for the decision maker to safeguard own interests while making use of expert information.
Descriptors: Decision Making
University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005, Chicago, IL 60637. Tel: 773-753-3347; Web site:; e-mail:
Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Research
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A