One way to improve struggling schools' access to effective teachers is to use selective transfer incentives. Such incentives offer bonuses for the highest-performing teachers to move into schools serving the most disadvantaged students. In this report, we provide evidence from a randomized experiment that tested whether such a policy intervention can improve student test scores and other outcomes in low-achieving schools. The intervention, known to participants as the Talent Transfer Initiative (TTI), was implemented in 10 school districts in seven states. The highest-performing teachers in each district--those who ranked in roughly the top 20 percent within their subject and grade span in terms of raising student achievement year after year (an approach known as value added)--were identified. These teachers were offered $20,000, paid in installments over a two-year period, if they transferred into and remained in designated schools that had low average test scores. The main findings from the study include: (1) The transfer incentive successfully attracted high value-added teachers to fill targeted vacancies; (2) The transfer incentive had a positive impact on test scores (math and reading) in targeted elementary classrooms; and (3) The transfer incentive had a positive impact on teacher-retention rates during the payout period; retention of the high-performing teachers who transferred was similar to their counterparts in the fall immediately after the last payout. Seven appendixes are included: (1) Supplemental Materials for Chapters I and II; (2) Value-Added Analysis to Identify Highest-Performing Teachers; (3) Supplemental Materials for Chapter III; (4) Identification of Focal Teachers; (5) Supplemental Materials for Chapter IV; (6) Supplemental Materials for Chapter V; and (7) Supplemental Materials for Chapter VI. (Contains 114 footnotes, 61 figures, and 92 tables.) [For the executive summary, see ED544268.]