ERIC Number: EJ997912
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2013-Feb
Pages: 11
Abstractor: As Provided
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: ISSN-0272-7757
EISSN: N/A
Incentives from Curriculum Tracking
Koerselman, Kristian
Economics of Education Review, v32 p140-150 Feb 2013
Curriculum tracking creates incentives in the years before its start, and we should therefore expect test scores to be higher during those years. I find robust evidence for incentive effects of tracking in the UK based on the UK comprehensive school reform. Results from the Swedish comprehensive school reform are inconclusive. Internationally, I find a large and widening test score gap between early and late tracking countries. Incentive effects of tracking show how early age scores can be endogenous with respect to later-age policies, and add to a growing literature on incentives in education. (Contains 7 tables and 6 figures.)
Descriptors: Foreign Countries, Educational Change, Inspection, Alignment (Education), Curriculum Design, Incentives, Achievement Gap, Scores, Educational Practices
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Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Research
Education Level: Elementary Secondary Education
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A
Identifiers - Location: Sweden; United Kingdom
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A