This paper examines two issues in telecommunications policy in which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has attempted to pursue policies that were distant from the policy desires of their supervising committees in Congress, and in which congressmen made use of various instruments of congressional influence: the FCC's attempt to restructure telephone prices by imposing end-user access charges, and the debate over whether rate of return regulation should be replaced by price cap regulation. It is noted that, in both cases, the agency took a position that was viewed with strong disfavor by Congress. The relationship between Congress and federal agencies is discussed, and the strategies employed by committee members and the FCC in the access charge and price cap regulation cases are analyzed. It is concluded that, while the FCC was forced to reconsider its position and move to a position somewhat more acceptable to congressional committees, it did not have to give up so much ground that Congress had its own way; rather, the outcomes reflected a mix of bureaucratic autonomy and congressional influence. (15 footnotes) (EW)