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ERIC Number: ED598873
Record Type: Non-Journal
Publication Date: 2019-May
Pages: N/A
Abstractor: As Provided
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: N/A
EISSN: N/A
Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania. NBER Working Paper No. 25903
Mbiti, Isaac; Romero, Mauricio; Schipper, Youdi
National Bureau of Economic Research
We use a field experiment in Tanzania to compare the effectiveness on learning of two teacher performance pay systems. The first is a Pay for Percentile system (a rank-order tournament). The second rewards teachers based on multiple proficiency thresholds. Pay for Percentile can (under certain conditions) induce optimal effort among teachers, but our threshold system is easier to implement and provides teachers with clearer goals and targets. Both systems improved student test scores. However, the multiple-thresholds system was more effective in boosting student learning and is less costly. [This evaluation was funded by Twaweza with supplemental funding from the REACH Trust Fund at the World Bank. Financial support was also provided by the Asociacion Mexicana de Cultura, A.C.]
National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org
Publication Type: Reports - Evaluative
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: World Bank
Authoring Institution: National Bureau of Economic Research
Identifiers - Location: Tanzania
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A