NotesFAQContact Us
Collection
Advanced
Search Tips
Peer reviewed Peer reviewed
Direct linkDirect link
ERIC Number: EJ948185
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2011-Oct
Pages: 24
Abstractor: As Provided
Reference Count: 45
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: ISSN-0022-0027
The Dark Side of Altruistic Third-Party Punishment
Leibbrandt, Andreas; Lopez-Perez, Raul
Journal of Conflict Resolution, v55 n5 p761-784 Oct 2011
This article experimentally studies punishment from unaffected third parties in ten different games. The authors show that third-party punishment exhibits several features that are arguably undesirable. First, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses a socially efficient or a Pareto efficient allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Interestingly, this form of punishment is especially pronounced in women and more left-wing participants. Second, third parties punish strongly a decider if she chooses an equitable allocation and becomes the richest party as a result. Finally, third parties considerably punish passive parties who make no choice, especially if the latter are richer than the third party. Implications of these findings for social theory are discussed. (Contains 1 figure, 6 tables, and 11 notes.)
SAGE Publications. 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320. Tel: 800-818-7243; Tel: 805-499-9774; Fax: 800-583-2665; e-mail: journals@sagepub.com; Web site: http://sagepub.com
Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Research
Education Level: Adult Education
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A