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ERIC Number: EJ911139
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2011
Pages: 9
Abstractor: As Provided
Reference Count: 11
ISSN: ISSN-0022-0485
The Pollution Game: A Classroom Game Demonstrating the Relative Effectiveness of Emissions Taxes and Tradable Permits
Corrigan, Jay R.
Journal of Economic Education, v42 n1 p70-78 2011
This classroom game illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of various regulatory frameworks aimed at internalizing negative externalities from pollution. Specifically, the game divides students into three groups--a government regulatory agency and two polluting firms--and allows them to work through a system of uniform command-and-control regulation, a tradable emissions permit framework, and an emissions tax. Students observe how flexible, market-oriented regulatory frameworks can outperform inflexible command-and-control. More important, given the ongoing debate about how best to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, students also can observe how the introduction of abatement-cost uncertainty can cause one market-oriented solution to outperform another. (Contains 4 tables and 5 notes.)
Routledge. Available from: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. 325 Chestnut Street Suite 800, Philadelphia, PA 19106. Tel: 800-354-1420; Fax: 215-625-2940; Web site:
Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Descriptive
Education Level: Higher Education; Postsecondary Education
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A