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ERIC Number: EJ877843
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2010
Pages: 8
Abstractor: As Provided
Reference Count: 9
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: ISSN-0022-0485
Geometry of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium with Application to Commons and Anticommons
D'Agata, Antonio
Journal of Economic Education, v41 n2 p169-176 2010
The author develops a simple geometric analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the price-quantity space by exploiting the economic content of the first-order condition. The approach makes it clear that strategic interdependency in oligopoly originates from externalities among producers. This explains why cartels are unstable and casts oligopoly within the more general commons-anticommons framework. (Contains 4 figures and 2 notes.)
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Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Descriptive
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A