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ERIC Number: EJ868415
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2009-Oct
Pages: 7
Abstractor: As Provided
Reference Count: 0
ISSN: ISSN-1049-0965
Simulating Terrorism: Credible Commitment, Costly Signaling, and Strategic Behavior
Siegel, David A.; Young, Joseph K.
PS: Political Science and Politics, v42 n4 p765-771 Oct 2009
We present two simulations designed to convey the strategic nature of terrorism and counterterrorism. The first is a simulated hostage crisis, designed primarily to illustrate the concepts of credible commitment and costly signaling. The second explores high-level decision making of both a terrorist group and the state, and is designed to highlight scarce-resource allocation and organizational dynamics. The simulations should be useful both in a traditional classroom setting as well as to the larger public. We provide a primer on the subject matter, and all the material necessary to run the simulations.
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Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Evaluative
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A