ERIC Number: EJ862155
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2009-Nov
Abstractor: As Provided
Reference Count: 46
Moral Intuitions, Moral Expertise and Moral Reasoning
Musschenga, Albert W.
Journal of Philosophy of Education, v43 n4 p597-613 Nov 2009
In this article I examine the consequences of the dominance of intuitive thinking in moral judging and deciding for the role of moral reasoning in moral education. I argue that evidence for the reliability of moral intuitions is lacking. We cannot determine when we can trust our intuitive moral judgements. Deliberate and critical reasoning is needed, but it cannot replace intuitive thinking. Following Robin Hogarth, I argue that intuitive judgements can be improved. The expertise model for moral development, proposed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus, not only teaches us how we acquire intuitive moral judgements, it also shows the interconnectedness of intuitive thinking and deliberate reasoning. Analysing the expertise model in more detail, I show that it cannot do justice to the importance of reasoning skills. Reasoning skills are needed because we expect people to be able to argue for their standpoints. I conclude that moral education should not only aim at improving intuitive moral judgements, but also at acquiring reasoning skills.
Descriptors: Ethical Instruction, Moral Values, Moral Development, Values Education, Intuition, Value Judgment, Reliability, Critical Thinking, Expertise, Models, Educational Objectives, Epistemology, Educational Philosophy, Educational Theories, Role of Education
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Publication Type: Journal Articles; Opinion Papers
Education Level: N/A
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