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ERIC Number: EJ827135
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2009
Pages: 13
Abstractor: As Provided
Reference Count: 12
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: ISSN-0022-0485
Self-Selection, Optimal Income Taxation, and Redistribution
Amegashie, J. Atsu
Journal of Economic Education, v40 n1 p55-67 Win 2009
The author makes a pedagogical contribution to optimal income taxation. Using a very simple model adapted from George A. Akerlof (1978), he demonstrates a key result in the approach to public economics and welfare economics pioneered by Nobel laureate James Mirrlees. He shows how incomplete information, in addition to the need to preserve incentives, acts as a limit to a government's redistributive power. The model and technical analysis allow easy handling of three self-selection constraints in a manner that is accessible to students with knowledge of only intermediate microeconomics and elementary algebra. The diagrammatic exposition allows him to present interesting and insightful results. (Contains 3 figures and 11 notes.)
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Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Descriptive
Education Level: Higher Education; Postsecondary Education
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A