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ERIC Number: EJ810260
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2004
Pages: 19
Abstractor: As Provided
Reference Count: 23
ISSN: ISSN-0022-0027
The Limitations of Fair Division: An Experimental Evaluation of Three Procedures
Schneider, Gerald; Kramer, Ulrike Sabrina
Journal of Conflict Resolution, v48 n4 p506-524 2004
Mathematical procedures that promise an envy-free, equitable, and efficient solution to distributional conflicts have received widespread attention. Two fair-division mechanisms, adjusted Knaster and proportional Knaster, which are similar to the well-known adjusted-winner procedure, are compared with the less fair divide-and-choose mechanism. Results show that participants largely prefer the adjusted-Knaster procedure to the two alternatives. Adjusted Knaster, closely followed by proportional Knaster, also promises the highest average payoff. Yet the sophisticated mechanisms cease to perform better than divide-and-choose once actors receive the possibility to deviate from the mandatory bargaining protocols of fair-division procedures. The preference for adjusted and proportional Knaster is found to be a partial function of the participants' psychological profile. The more "antisocial" a participant, the more likely this respondent is to opt for a procedure with a compensatory mechanism. (Contains 3 tables and 15 footnotes.)
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Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Evaluative
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A