ERIC Number: EJ804941
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2008-Jun
Abstractor: As Provided
Reference Count: 0
Philosophical Skepticism Not Relativism Is "the" Problem with the Strong Programme in Science Studies and with Educational Constructivism
Papayannakos, Dimitris P.
Science & Education, v17 n6 p573-611 Jun 2008
The structure of David's Bloor argument for the Strong Programme (SP) in Science Studies is criticized from the philosophical perspective of anti-skeptical, scientific realism. The paper transforms the common criticism of SP--that the symmetry principle of SP implies an untenable form of cognitive relativism--into the clear philosophical issue of naturalism versus Platonism. It is also argued that the concrete patterns of SP's interest-explanations and its sociological definition of knowledge involve philosophical skepticism. It is claimed, then, that the most problematic elements of SP reside primarily in philosophical skepticism. It is also claimed that this sort of criticism can be directed against other more radical, versions of constructivism in science and science education studies.
Descriptors: Constructivism (Learning), Criticism, Science Education, Scientific Principles, Philosophy, Sociology, Knowledge Level, Realism
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Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Descriptive
Education Level: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A