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ERIC Number: EJ772845
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2003
Pages: 20
Abstractor: Author
Reference Count: 33
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: ISSN-0276-8739
Hospital Selective Contracting without Consumer Choice: What Can We Learn from Medi-Cal?
Bamezai, Anil; Melnick, Glenn A.; Mann, Joyce M.; Zwanziger, Jack
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, v22 n1 p65-84 Win 2003
In the selective contracting era, consumer choice has generally been absent in most state Medicaid programs, including California's (called Medi-Cal). In a setting where beneficiary exit is not a threat, a large payer may have both the incentives and the ability to exercise undue market power, potentially exposing an already vulnerable population to further harm. The analyses presented here of Medi-Cal contracting data, however, do not yield compelling evidence in favor of the undue market power hypothesis. Instead, hospital competition appears to explain with greater consistency why certain hospitals choose to contract with Medi-Cal while others do not, the trends in inpatient prices paid by Medi-Cal over time, and the effect of price competition on service cutbacks, such as emergency room closures. (Contains 7 tables and 1 figure.)
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Subscription Department, 111 River Street, Hoboken, NJ 07030-5774. Tel: 800-825-7550; Tel: 201-748-6645; Fax: 201-748-6021; e-mail: subinfo@wiley.com; Web site: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/browse/?type=JOURNAL
Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Evaluative
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A
Identifiers - Location: California