ERIC Number: EJ517803
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 1995
Reference Count: N/A
Optimum College Admissions, Taxes and Tuitions When Completion Is Uncertain.
Garratt, Rod; Marshall, John M.
Education Economics, v3 n3 p219-34 Dec 1995
Explores the rationale for college subsidies in most world economies, treating precollege achievement as an insurable risk. Contract theory considers optimum insurance contracts for this risk and views public finance of college education as providing the insurance. The theory yields conditions on optimum taxes and fees. Rationing by ability/achievement occurs at the margin between matriculating and not matriculating. (16 references) (MLH)
Publication Type: Reports - Evaluative; Numerical/Quantitative Data; Journal Articles
Education Level: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A