International political discourse has implied that upskilling leads to higher productivity and growth. Combining aspects from skills theory and institutional theory, this article asks what role upskilling can play in making bad jobs better, drawing on previous research about the process of professionalising the cleaning occupation in Norway. In line with institutional theory on educational transfer, it interprets a change in educational skills -- the introduction of the trade certificate for cleaners -- as a way of legitimising an occupation with a dubious reputation, 'borrowing' legitimacy from the educational system. The trade certificate functioned as a component in the 'reverse signalling' of skills towards procurers of cleaning services and potential employees, which was intended to improve skill use and by that, job quality. I suggest this strategy was founded on a reliance on knowledge society narratives: that education and skills yield complexity, productivity and job quality. However, this change in 'formal structure' did little to change industry job quality, which was subjected to a strict tender-based regime where price generally outweighed skills. A general application of a collective wage agreement was necessary to improve job quality, demonstrating the limits of upskilling for changing work design, even in a collective bargaining system.