Minds, Machines and Phenomenology: Some Reflections on Dreyfus' What Computers Can't do.

Pylyshyn, Zenon W.

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Peer reviewed

ERIC Number: EJ125190

Record Type: Journal

Publication Date: 1974

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Minds, Machines and Phenomenology: Some Reflections on Dreyfus' What Computers Can't do

Pylyshyn, Zenon W.

Cognition, 3, 1, 57-77, 74/75

Rather than provide a general review of Dreyfus critique this article concentrates on certain fundamental criticisms that Dreyfus directs at the information-processing approach to cognitive psychology and points out the unique conception of what it means to understand cognition which separates a phenomenologist from the typical cognitive psychologist. (Author/RC)

Descriptors: Analog Computers, Artificial Intelligence, Bionics, Cognitive Processes, Computers, Digital Computers, Information Processing, Simulation

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