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ERIC Number: EJ1156426
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2017
Pages: 20
Abstractor: As Provided
ISSN: ISSN-1557-3060
Strategic Matching of Teachers and Schools with (and without) Accountability Pressure
Ahn, Tom
Education Finance and Policy, v12 n4 p516-535 Fall 2017
Accountability systems are designed to introduce market pressures to increase efficiency in education. One potential channel by which this can occur is to match with effective teachers in the transfer market. I use a smooth maximum score estimator model, North Carolina data, and the state's bonus system to analyze how teachers and schools change matching behavior in response to accountability pressure. Schools under a high degree of accountability pressure match with teachers who are better at raising test scores. Estimation with a control year sample (when pressure was absent) bolsters these findings. Accountability pressure seems to motivate schools to compete for effective teachers.
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Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Evaluative
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A
Identifiers - Location: North Carolina
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A