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ERIC Number: ED558091
Record Type: Non-Journal
Publication Date: 2014
Pages: 47
Abstractor: As Provided
Reference Count: 83
Who Chooses Incentivized Pay Structures? Exploring the Link between Performance and Preferences for Compensation Reform in the Teacher Labor Market. CEDR Working Paper. WP #2014-­8
Goldhaber, Dan; Bignell, Wes; Farley, Amy; Walch, Joe; Cowan, James
Center for Education Data & Research
In this paper we report on research examining the revealed preferences of teachers in Denver Public Schools who were given the opportunity to select between remaining on a traditional salary schedule or opting in to one of the nation's highest profile pay reform systems, Denver's Professional Compensation System for Teachers. The incentive structure creates differential earnings risk for teachers according to their experience and measured effectiveness as well as their staffing assignment and school. We find that teachers are generally responsive to the eligibility criteria, but many teachers who would have earned more under the new system chose not to participate. Survey evidence suggests that teachers' notions of fairness and confusion about the structure of the new system may have contributed to these decisions. The following are appended: (1) ProComp Program Information; and (2) Survey Details.
Center for Education Data & Research. 3876 Bridge Way North Suite 201, Seattle, WA 98103. Tel: 206-547-5585; Fax: 206-547-1641; e-mail:; Web site:
Publication Type: Reports - Research
Education Level: Elementary Secondary Education
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: Center for Education Data & Research (CEDR)
Identifiers - Location: Colorado