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ERIC Number: ED538352
Record Type: Non-Journal
Publication Date: 2013
Pages: 4
Abstractor: ERIC
Reference Count: N/A
Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching. [Executive Summary]
Springer, Matthew G.; Hamilton, Laura; McCaffrey, Daniel F.; Ballou, Dale; Le, Vi-Nhuan; Pepper, Matthew; Lockwood, J. R.; Stecher, Brian M.
National Center on Performance Incentives
The Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT) was a three-year study conducted in the Metropolitan Nashville School System from 2006-07 through 2008-09, in which middle school mathematics teachers voluntarily participated in a controlled experiment to assess the effect of financial rewards for teachers whose students showed unusually large gains on standardized tests. The experiment was intended to test the notion that rewarding teachers for improved scores would cause scores to rise. It was up to participating teachers to decide what, if anything, they needed to do to raise student performance: participate in more professional development, seek coaching, collaborate with other teachers, or simply reflect on their practices. Thus, POINT was focused on the notion that a significant problem in American education is the absence of appropriate incentives, and that correcting the incentive structure would, in and of itself, constitute an effective intervention that improved student outcomes. This executive summary presents the findings from the Project on Incentives in Teaching. [For the full report, "Teacher Pay for Performance: Experimental Evidence from the Project on Incentives in Teaching," see ED513347.]
National Center on Performance Incentives. Peabody College of Vanderbilt University, PMB #43, 230 Appleton Place, Nashville, TN 37203. Tel: 615-322-5538; Fax: 615-322-6018; e-mail:; Web site:
Publication Type: Reports - Research
Education Level: Grade 5; Middle Schools
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: Vanderbilt University, National Center on Performance Incentives
What Works Clearinghouse Reviewed: Does Not Meet Evidence Standards
IES Cited: ED518026