ERIC Number: ED505046
Record Type: Non-Journal
Publication Date: 2009-Apr
Abstractor: As Provided
Reference Count: N/A
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match. NBER Working Paper No. 14864
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Pathak, Parag A.; Roth, Alvin E.
National Bureau of Economic Research
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school--single tie breaking--in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.
Descriptors: High Schools, Urban Schools, Efficiency, Student Placement, Admission (School), Public Schools, School Choice, Simulation
National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org/cgi-bin/get_bars.pl?bar=pub
Publication Type: Reports - Descriptive
Education Level: High Schools; Secondary Education
Authoring Institution: National Bureau of Economic Research
Identifiers - Location: New York