NotesFAQContact Us
Collection
Advanced
Search Tips
ERIC Number: ED504080
Record Type: Non-Journal
Publication Date: 2008-Dec
Pages: 0
Abstractor: As Provided
Reference Count: 0
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: N/A
Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation. NBER Working Paper No. 14618
Featherstone, Clayton; Niederle, Muriel
National Bureau of Economic Research
Criteria for evaluating school choice mechanisms are first, whether truth-telling is sometimes punished and second, how efficient the match is. With common knowledge preferences, Deferred Acceptance (DA) dominates the Boston mechanism by the first criterion and is ambiguously ranked by the second. Our laboratory experiments confirm this. A new ex ante perspective, where preferences are private information, introduces new efficiency costs borne by strategy-proof mechanisms, like DA. In a symmetric environment, truth-telling can be an equilibrium under Boston, and Boston can first-order stochastically dominate DA in terms of efficiency, both in theory and in the laboratory.
National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org/cgi-bin/get_bars.pl?bar=pub
Publication Type: Reports - Evaluative
Education Level: Elementary Secondary Education
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: National Bureau of Economic Research