ERIC Number: ED501978
Record Type: Non-Journal
Publication Date: 2008-Jan
Abstractor: As Provided
Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets. NBER Working Paper No. 13766
Ostrovsky, Michael; Schwarz, Michael
National Bureau of Economic Research
This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark amount of information, students and employers will not find it profitable to contract early; if they disclose more, unraveling will occur.
Descriptors: Disclosure, Universities, Academic Records, Recruitment, Personnel Selection, College Students, Economic Research, Economics
National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org/cgi-bin/get_bars.pl?bar=pub
Publication Type: Reports - Descriptive
Education Level: Higher Education; Postsecondary Education
Authoring Institution: National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.