This paper summarizes work from a dissertation that examines the determinants of public school performance, focusing on the roles of incentives and parental involvement. The thesis presents theory and related empirics. In the theory, it analyzes the effects of competition on public school productivity, with and without parental involvement, as well as the parental involvement decision itself. In the empirical work, it measures the relative impacts of competition and collective parental pressure on school performance and the strength of interactions between them. The thesis makes three main contributions. First, it presents a conceptual framework for understanding how the sorts of incentives public schools face in practice affect school productivity. Second, the research provides empirical evidence that highlights collective parental pressure as an important determinant of school performance, as measured by achievement tests. Third, it provides estimates that cast doubt on the common presumption that greater competition will raise public-school productivity uniformly. The thesis concludes by discussing policy implications and offering a few brief thoughts about unresolved issues. (Author/WFA)