Some criticisms leveled by Richard Bates and Thomas Greenfield against traditional views of the science of administration may be justified, but they do not apply to a science of administration based in the newly emerging philosophy of science. This paper begins by introducing these criticisms, which focus on the traditional views' failure to accommodate values, the subjective basis of knowledge, and the functional purposes of administrative theory. The paper next reviews the new philosophy of science, which incorporates new concepts about statements, evidence, terms, and the inexclusivity of theories. The new philosophy also involves trends away from foundational theories of justification and toward coherence theories of justification, as well as away from instrumentalism and toward realism. The implications of these factors for the development of a new science of administration are explored next. The importance of the role of human interpretation in understanding administration is examined in the paper's concluding section. Distinctions are drawn between physical events in which brute facts are measurable and social situations in which causal factors are exceedingly complex but can reasonably be assumed to be regular and structured. It is noted further that the notion of interpretation presupposes a reality subject to interpretation. Six pages of notes are provided. (PGD)