Viewing truth and knowledge as intertextual phenomena, the theory of rhetoric-as-epistemic presented in this paper defines the consensus model as unanimity and the "discourse community" model as involving primary texts (rather than people). A theory of intertextual reality and knowledge is developed, based on five major assertions: (1) Even if truth and reality exist independently, humans have no direct access to it. (2) The meaning or truth of anything is extrinsic; that is, things, events, or words are dependent upon and defined by context. (3) Meaning or truth is always dynamic and ambiguous. (4) Knowledge is metaphor. And (5) Rhetoric-as-epistemic ought to be more concerned with theories of writing and reading than with theories of speaking and listening. The following three implications of rhetorical epistemology based on intertextuality are explored: that the traditional conception of writing must enlarge, that writing itself is "radicalized," and that if grammatology "erases" truth and the "logos," it will also erase any traditional concept of the human. Each implication suggests ways in which our concept of and relationship to writing should change or is already changing. (JD)