ERIC Number: ED272780
Record Type: Non-Journal
Publication Date: 1986-Aug
Pages: 14
Abstractor: N/A
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: N/A
EISSN: N/A
The Adequacy of Cognitive Psychology's Explanation of Consciousness from an Existential View.
Slife, Brent D.; Barnard, Suzanne
Cognitive psychology has been considered to be at the vortex of a revolution in psychology. Schools of humanism and existentialism were originally needed as reactions to the narrowness of behaviorism. The "reactions" in psychology continue to be relevant and needed, particularly existential psychology. The qualities of consiousness in existential and cognitive psychology illustrate the differing views of human reasoning. Three qualities are fundamental to existentialism and phenomenology: (1) the ability to be aware of or reflect upon one's self or existence; (2) the ability to voluntarily direct one's thought and actions; and (3) the goal-directed or telic nature of consciousness. Consciousness appears to have two general meanings for the cognitive scientist: consciousness of one's environment and consciousness of one's self (metacognition). Cognitive psychology relies on demonstrative or logical reasoning. Existential psychology emphasizes dialectical reasoning. If consciousness is a foundational conception for both cognitive and existential psychology as exponents claim, then wide differences exist in general theorizing. Cognitive scientists have succeeded in drawing psychology's attention to the mind, but their explanations seem to merely extend the deterministic, mechanistic, and demonstrative assumptions of behaviorism. The key to unlocking a consciousness that is truly aware, responsible, and intentional is to add dialectical reasoning to one's explanation of human mentation. (ABL)
Descriptors: Cognitive Processes, Cognitive Psychology, Epistemology, Existentialism, Phenomenology, Theories
Publication Type: Opinion Papers; Speeches/Meeting Papers
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A