The concept of institutional academic freedom is discussed. Attention is directed to how the concept confounds the distinct values and standards traditionally used in analysis of cases involving individual rights in higher education, and legal and practical problems it raises for the maintenance of traditional concepts of academic freedom. The idea of institutional academic freedom--to the extent that it may not derive directly from the First Amendment--appears to grow from the general idea of university autonomy. The various courts have approached the question of latitude for institutional decision-making from different points of view about whether there is a corporate academic freedom, when and in what circumstances it should be invoked, and what ends the freedom serves. Whatever else academic freedom may be, in legal terms it is a derivative of the constitutional protection afforded free expression. The issue at hand is whether in the derivation one can find a protection for institutions as well as for individuals. Basic issues include: prohibition of governmental infringement, and the conflict of institutional discretion with public law and policy. In general, the notion of institutional academic freedom has achieved only a very qualified recognition among state and federal courts. (SW)