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ERIC Number: ED218101
Record Type: Non-Journal
Publication Date: 1980
Pages: 61
Abstractor: N/A
Reference Count: N/A
Decision Analysis for Multicandidate Voting Systems. Applications of Elementary Decision Analysis to Political Science. [and] An Application of Voting Theory to Congress. Applications of Decision Theory and Game Theory to American Politics. Modules and Monographs in Undergraduate Mathematics and Its Applications Project. UMAP Units 384 and 386.
Merrill, Samuel, III; Enelow, James M.
This document consists of two modules. The first studies a variety of multicandidate voting systems, including approval, Borda, and cumulative voting, using a model which takes account of a voter's intensity of preference for candidates. The voter's optimal strategy is investigated for each voting system using decision criteria under uncertainty (Savage regret and Laplace criteria) and under risk (expected utility). Voting systems are compared with regard to the relative ease with which the voter can approximate his or her optimal strategy, the relative freedom of the voting system from offering superfluous strategies, and the empirical impact as determined by survey data. The second module is designed to help the user gain an understanding of how a simple theory of voting can be used to analyze strategic voting in Congress. It is noted that voting in the United States Congress is frequently strategic. A model is presented to explain and predict voting on congressional amendments. Both units contain problem sets, and answers to these exercises are provided. (MP)
Publication Type: Guides - Classroom - Learner
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: National Science Foundation, Washington, DC.
Authoring Institution: Education Development Center, Inc., Newton, MA.