The polemical stance of Greville Rumble's paper argues for a "morality of humanity" that would produce a redistribution of material wealth, thus enabling (among other things) free use at point of access for higher education--and distance higher education in particular. The implicit assumption of this moral argument is that allowing such free access will lead to greater social justice by allowing the gaining of qualifications, which, in turn, lead to wealth redistribution. In this article, the author provides his arguments against Rumble's stance. The author contends that the argument sets up liberal frameworks for access against libertarian ones, and argues that both have failed to ensure that large numbers of the poorest and least materially privileged in the United Kingdom have access to higher education and thus redress the moral wrongs imposed by skewed wealth distribution. What is completely ignored, however, is that while access to higher education may improve individual lives by resulting in larger earning power, there is no evidence from the developed world that such access makes much macro-level difference to the relative distribution or differentials of wealth. There are too many other overwhelmingly strong structural factors, including inheritance and social capital. In established first-world economies, access to higher education, in and of itself, cannot provide sufficient counterbalance against these other established big players.