ERIC Number: ED281111
Record Type: RIE
Publication Date: 1987-Apr
Pages: 24
Abstractor: N/A
Reference Count: 0
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: N/A
Situational Salience as a Determinant of Expectations in Experimental Games.
Patch, Michael E.; Stahelski, Anthony J.
Previous research provides support for two distinct models of expectation behavior in experimental games. The similarity pattern describes expectations that are similar to the actor's behavior regardless of whether the actor is cooperative or competitive. The triangularity pattern describes expectations that are both similar and dissimilar to cooperator's behavior and expectations that are only similar to competitor's behavior. In an attempt to reconcile these two positions, it was suggested that variations in the measurement context may create differences in situational salience which then affects both expectational patterns and attributional tendencies of the subjects. Undergraduate students participated in an experiment involving the Prisoners Dilemma game which varied whether or not measurements were taken "in the situation" or "out of the situation." It was predicted that, while competitors would not vary, cooperators would show similar expectations and make environmental attributions in the situation and show heterogeneous expectations and make dispositional attributions out of the situation. These predictions were confirmed for cooperators and an attributional analysis was used to further explain the results. (Author/NB)
Publication Type: Reports - Research; Speeches/Meeting Papers
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A
Identifiers: Prisoners Dilemma Game; Situational Salience
Note: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Psychological Association (67th, Long Beach, CA, April 23-26, 1987).


