The late John Wilson has long been a champion of education as a human undertaking with an integrity of its own, as distinct from one that is essentially subordinate to extrinsic interests and influences (e.g. religious, political, commercial). He has also been a fearless critic of forms of thinking that he regarded as failing to articulate adequately that integrity. In keeping with this view he has boldly argued that the philosophy of education must be conceived and practised as a "sui generis" activity. In this memorial essay I am keen to show that Wilson is right, and crucially so, in arguing that education is a field of action in its own right and in maintaining that the philosophy of education is a "sui generis" activity. I am also keen to illustrate however, that Wilson is wrong in decisive respects in how he conceives of the "sui generis" character of the philosophy of education and in the restricted understanding of education as a practice that flows from this conception. Acknowledging a debt to Wilson's writings, the essay seeks to pursue further some of his more incisive insights and to connect these to some promising inspirations for educational thought and practice that have their origins in the distinctive, but largely eclipsed work of the historical figure Socrates. To argue thus is to highlight the radical nature of the claim that educational thought and action constitute a "sui generis" undertaking and to call into question any claim that philosophy of education is "a branch of" one or other form of academic philosophy.