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Showing all 12 results
Max, Jeffrey; Constantine, Jill; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2014
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
Descriptors: Merit Pay, Incentives, Grants, Federal Aid
Max, Jeffrey; Constantine, Jill; Wellington, Alison; Hallgren, Kristin; Glazerman, Steven; Chiang, Hanley; Speroni, Cecilia – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2014
The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) provides grants to support performance-based compensation systems for teachers and principals in high-need schools. The study measures the impact of pay-for-performance bonuses as part of a comprehensive compensation system within a large, multisite random assignment study design. The treatment schools were to…
Descriptors: Merit Pay, Incentives, Grants, Federal Aid
Max, Jeffrey; Glazerman, Steven – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2014
Lack of researcher consensus on how to measure disadvantaged students' access to effective teaching has made it challenging for practitioners to draw lessons from the data. This brief aims to help policymakers understand the emerging evidence by synthesizing findings from three peer-reviewed studies that collectively span 17 states. The…
Descriptors: Disadvantaged Youth, Instructional Effectiveness, Educational Quality, Achievement Gap
Max, Jeffrey; Glazerman, Steven – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2014
This document represents the technical appendix intended to accompany "Do Disadvantaged Students Get Less Effective Teaching? Key Findings from Recent Institute of Education Sciences Studies. NCEE Evaluation Brief. NCEE 2014-4010." Contents include: (1) Summary of Related, Non-Peer-Reviewed Studies; (2) Methods for Comparing Findings…
Descriptors: Disadvantaged Youth, At Risk Students, Teacher Competencies, Poverty
Glazerman, Steven; Protik, Ali; Teh, Bing-ru; Bruch, Julie; Max, Jeffrey – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2013
One way to improve struggling schools' access to effective teachers is to use selective transfer incentives. Such incentives offer bonuses for the highest-performing teachers to move into schools serving the most disadvantaged students. In this report, we provide evidence from a randomized experiment that tested whether such a policy intervention…
Descriptors: Teacher Effectiveness, Incentives, Teacher Transfer, Educational Policy
Glazerman, Steven; Protik, Ali; Teh, Bing-ru; Bruch, Julie; Max, Jeffrey – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2013
One way to improve struggling schools' access to effective teachers is to use selective transfer incentives. Such incentives offer bonuses for the highest-performing teachers to move into schools serving the most disadvantaged students. In this report, we provide evidence from a randomized experiment that tested whether such a policy intervention…
Descriptors: Resource Allocation, Student Characteristics, Teacher Attendance, Cost Effectiveness
Glazerman, Steven; Protik, Ali; Teh, Bing-ru; Bruch, Julie; Seftor, Neil – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2012
This report describes the implementation and intermediate impacts of an intervention designed to provide incentives to induce a school district's highest-performing teachers to work in its lowest-achieving schools to improve student achievement. The report is part of a larger study that used random assignment to form equivalent groups of…
Descriptors: Intervention, Models, Incentives, Academic Achievement
Glazerman, Steven; Protik, Ali; Teh, Bing-ru; Bruch, Julie; Seftor, Neil – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2012
This report describes the implementation and intermediate impacts of an intervention designed to provide incentives for a school district's highest-performing teachers to work in its lowest-achieving schools. The report is part of a larger study in which random assignment was used to form two equivalent groups of classrooms organized into teacher…
Descriptors: Control Groups, Intervention, Incentives, Academic Achievement
Glazerman, Steven; Max, Jeffrey – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2011
This brief describes the prevalence of highest-performing teachers in ten purposely selected districts across seven states. The overall patterns indicate that low-income students have unequal access, on average, to the district's highest-performing teachers at the middle school level but not at the elementary level. However, there is evidence of…
Descriptors: Middle Schools, Poverty, Income, Teacher Effectiveness
Glazerman, Steven; Max, Jeffrey – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2011
This appendix describes the methods and provides further detail to support the evaluation brief, "Do Low-Income Students Have Equal Access to the Highest-Performing Teachers?" (Contains 8 figures, 6 tables and 5 footnotes.) [For the main report, "Do Low-Income Students Have Equal Access to the Highest-Performing Teachers? NCEE Evaluation Brief.…
Descriptors: Low Income Groups, Equal Education, Middle Schools, Poverty
Isenberg, Eric; Glazerman, Steven; Bleeker, Martha; Johnson, Amy; Lugo-Gil, Julieta; Grider, Mary; Dolfin, Sarah; Britton, Edward – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2009
One of the main policy responses to the problems of turnover and inadequate preparation among beginning teachers is to support them with a formal, comprehensive induction program. Congressional interest in formal, comprehensive teacher induction has grown in recent years. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), which reauthorized the…
Descriptors: Beginning Teacher Induction, Teacher Effectiveness, Teacher Persistence, Academic Achievement
Glazerman, Steven; Dolfin, Sarah; Bleeker, Martha; Johnson, Amy; Isenberg, Eric; Lugo-Gil, Julieta; Grider, Mary; Britton, Edward; Ali, Melanie – National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, 2008
In practice, teacher induction is common, but induction that is intensive, comprehensive, structured, and sequentially delivered in response to teachers' emerging pedagogical needs is less so. Congressional interest in formal, comprehensive teacher induction has grown in recent years. The National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional…
Descriptors: Beginning Teacher Induction, Mentors, Control Groups, Teacher Persistence

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