We would like to thank the commentators for their time and thoughtfulness--the commentaries are, in general, engaging and informative. Interestingly, most of the discussion has to do with the nature of representation, not with our basic critique of nativist infant research. Regarding the latter, there seems to be general agreement. Regarding…

We argue that the nativist-empiricist debate in developmental psychology is distorted, both theoretically and methodologically, by a shared framework of assumptions concerning the nature of representation. In particular, both sides of the debate assume models of representation that make the emergence of representation impossible. This, in turn,…

Computational models are powerful tools--too powerful, according to some. We argue that the idea that models can "do anything" is wrong, and we describe how their failures have been informative. We present new work showing surprising diversity in the effects of feedback on children's task-switching, such that some children perseverate despite this…

Recent research on children's thinking about the future has taken multiple directions, many of which are illustrated in the contributions to this special issue. In this commentary the topic is discussed in the context of research on children's understanding of time, and some of the adaptive challenges of thinking about the future are considered.…

In an accompanying study, Alibali et al. [Alibali, M. W., Ockuly, K. M., Fischer, A. D. (2009) "Learning new problem-solving strategies leads to changes in problem representation." "Cognitive Development, 24," 89-101.] present an important experimental result: introducing a new strategy can affect conceptual aspects of children's problem…

In our comments on Pacton and Deacon's discussion of children's spelling of morphemes we raise four issues: (1) whether the "timing" question should be about children's ages or about their psychological processes; (2) the crucial importance of individual differences in the study of the connections that people make between morphemes and spelling;…

A theory of education requires a theory of the mind that is to be educated. Modules are the central feature of the mind of the infant. Innate learning devices, modules, prepare the infant with the following competences: language, number, theory of mind, spatial navigation, music, etc. We propose that the child be taught what evolution has prepared…

Describes an ethnographic study of African American toddlers and families that focused on children's productive competence in naturally occurring narrativelike conversation. Examines emergence of narrative competence; posits definition incorporating minimal requirements for child participation within the fundamental essence of narrative structure.…

Reviews Baron-Cohen's study of autism and an explanatory theory called modularity of mindreading, which proposed a domain-specific modular psychological model based on evolutionary, developmental, psychopathological, and neurobiological considerations. Enumerates problems with the modularity approach and emphasized the evolution of domain general…

Comments on the article by Jones and Smith in this issue. Responds to the theses that perceptual information is as much at the core of concepts as is nonperceptual information and that concepts are not represented as such but are computed on-line when needed. Presents a view of the relationship between perception and conceptual knowledge…

Comments on the article by Jones and Smith in this issue. Describes a program of research that demonstrates the important influence of perception on the structure of concepts. Proposes that both perceptual and nonperceptual information are important to conceptual structure throughout the continuum of knowledge acquisition and that perception is a…

Comments on the article by Jones and Smith in this issue. Outlines different perspectives from which the issue of conceptual development is approached, elaborating on the functions concepts serve and variations in those functions. Notes points of agreement with the perceptual knowledge view and offers comments on the research supporting the…

This commentary on the article by Jones and Smith in this issue examines whether coherent conceptual cores exist in long-term memory; abstract propositions constitute conceptual cores; concepts in long-term memory control behavior; and the primary purpose of developing and using concepts is to taxonomize the environment. (TJQ)

Responds to four commentaries on the article by Jones and Smith in this issue. Suggests that the comments derive from the possibility that stable concepts might not exist and from the difficulty of imagining what cognition could be without represented concepts. Discusses traditional approaches to stability and variability, and considers what…