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ERIC Number: EJ688615
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2004-Jul
Pages: 21
Abstractor: Author
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: ISSN-0033-295X
EISSN: N/A
Reasoning From Inconsistency to Consistency
Johnson-Laird, P. N.; Girotto, Vittorio; Legrenzi, Paolo
Psychological Review, v111 n3 p640-661 Jul 2004
This article presents a theory of how individuals reason from inconsistency to consistency. The theory is based on 3 main principles. First, individuals try to construct a single mental model of a possibility that satisfies a current set of propositions, and if the task is impossible, they infer that the set is inconsistent. Second, when an inconsistency arises from an incontrovertible fact, they retract any singularly dubious proposition or any proposition that is inconsistent with the fact; otherwise, they retract whichever proposition mismatches the fact. A mismatch can arise from a proposition that has only mental models that conflict with the fact or fail to represent it. Third, individuals use their causal knowledge-in the form of models of possibilities-to create explanations of what led to the inconsistency. A computer program implements the theory, and experimental results support each of its principles.
American Psychological Association, 750 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20002-4242. Tel: 800-374-2721 (Toll Free); Tel: 202-336-5510; TDD/TTY: 202-336-6123; Fax: 202-336-5502; e-mail: journals@apa.org.
Publication Type: Journal Articles; Reports - Research
Education Level: N/A
Audience: N/A
Language: English
Sponsor: N/A
Authoring Institution: N/A
Grant or Contract Numbers: N/A