Contemporary approaches to moral education are influenced by the "domain theory" approach to understanding moral development (Turiel, 1983; 1998; Nucci, 2001). Domain theory holds there are distinct conventional, personal and moral domains; each constituting a cognitive "structured-whole" with its own normative source and sphere of influence. One of the strengths of domain theory is that separating convention from morality and distinguishing morality from self-interest provides a conceptual critique of both conventional values and the pursuit of self-interest. Relying on the work of Joseph Raz, this paper will show how a classical, neo-Aristotelian conception can also provide conceptual space for an ethical critique of convention and self-interest, yet deny that it must emanate from different normative sources. Practical implications for both of these theories will also be considered, pointing out the strengths of, as well as some areas of vulnerability for, both. (Contains 8 notes.)