These three papers consider various models and mechanisms for the achievement of industrial standardization. The first, "Duopoly Compatibility Standards with Partial Cooperation and Standards Leadership" (Sanford V. Berg, University of Florida) presents a model of duopolists producing differentiated substitutes, and considers the equilibrium outcomes for two products under Cournot rivalry, multiproduct monopoly, second-best standards-specification, and welfare maximization. The text is supplemented with two tables. The second paper, "The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evolution: Lessons from Electricity Supply History" (Paul A. David and Julie Ann Bunn, Stanford University), examines the historical development of the technology of electric light and power systems, with particular attention to the role which the induced invention of a compatibility-creating technical device (the rotary converter) played in the industry's technological and organizational development. The text is extensively footnoted, and 71 references are provided. The third paper, "Coordination through Committees and Markets" (Joseph Farrell, University of California at Berkeley, and Garth Saloner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), discusses two common mechanisms--standardization committees and "market leadership"--for achieving coordination, with particular reference to the choice of compatibility standards. The text is supplemented with figures, and is extensively footnoted. A list of 25 references is also provided. (Author/EW)