ERIC Number: EJ903783
Record Type: Journal
Publication Date: 2010-Oct
Pages: 3
Abstractor: As Provided
ISBN: N/A
ISSN: ISSN-0033-295X
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Postscript: Contrasting Predictions for Preference Reversal
Usher, Marius; Tsetsos, Konstantinos; Chater, Nick
Psychological Review, v117 n4 p1291-1293 Oct 2010
In this post scrit, the authors discuss an article by Hotaling, Busemeyer, and Li which provided a valuable reply to the challenges the current authors raised for the decision field theory (DFT) account of preference reversal in multiattribute choice. They agree with Hotaling, Busemeyer, and Li's observation that with the addition of an internal stopping rule--where a decision is reached when the first choice unit reaches a response criterion--the model is more stable and less subject to violations of dominance. Indeed, in its present form, DFT captures most existing data on preference reversals, and its limitations (due to linearity) have the virtue of facilitating analytical calculations. It is therefore interesting to contrast DFT and alternative accounts of preference reversals (e.g., leaky competing accumulators [LCA; Usher & McClelland, 2004] or the context-dependent advantage model [Tversky & Simonson, 1993]). This note builds on the improved clarity of DFT mechanisms resulting from this exchange and highlights predictions that could distinguish between competing explanations and drive further experimental research. We also note common aspects of DFT and LCA and draw implications for theories of decision making. (Contains 1 figure.)
Descriptors: Prediction, Models, Decision Making, Experiments, Responses, Grade Prediction, Inhibition
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Publication Type: Journal Articles; Opinion Papers
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Language: English
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